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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

not expand their license for the pipeline by extending the pipeline,
and that the Barneses' predecessors had forfeited their right to additional water. The court found no error in the trial court's decision that
the Barneses did not harm the Hussas by extending their pipeline.
The court held that Water Code section 1706 governed the case because the Barneses' predecessors acquired their water rights before the
Water Commission Act came into effect in 1914. As a result, the controlling test was that a water user may change the place where one uses
the water as long as the change does not adversely affect the rights of
other water users. Furthermore, the court held that the person seeking to change the place of use does not carry the burden of demonstrating that the change will not affect the rights of other water users.
The court held that the Barneses' predecessors in interest did
not forfeit the right to use water that did not fit through the pipeline.
Under California law, a water user forfeits the water rights the user
does not exercise within a five year period. The court was unable to
determine if the lower court believed the testimony of the witnesses. It
found that even if the lower court believed the testimony regarding the
excess water, the testimony was not sufficient to establish forfeiture of
rights through the nonuse of the water. The court reasoned that the
Hussas would have had to proffer evidence that water had been available for diversion for at least five years and that the Barneses' predecessors failed to divert it. The Hussas failed to proffer such evidence.
In affirming the trial courts decision, the court held that the
Barneses had an irrevocable water right and that extending their pipeline to use water at a different location did not adversely affect the
Hussas.
Jacki Lopez

N. Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d
821 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the California State Water Resources Control Board had jurisdiction over North Gualala Water
Company when it pumped from two wells that drew groundwater from
a subterranean stream; that the Board correctly construed a statute
compelling the Water Company to obtain a permit to pump groundwater from the two wells; and that the Board appropriately interpreted
pumping limitations placed on the permit).
The North Gualala Water Company ("NGWC") provided water service for approximately 1,000 customers in the town of Gualala. Between 1965 and 1989, NGWC held a permit from the California State
Water Resources Control Board's ("Board") predecessor which allowed
them to operate an infiltration gallery to divert a limited amount of
surface water directly from the North Fork of the Gualala River.

In

1989 and 1996, NGWC developed two production wells near the North
Fork. When developing the wells, NGWC believed the well pumped
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percolating groundwater, which was not subject to permitting by the
Board. The Board first agreed that the pumped water was percolating
groundwater and did not require a permit. However, the Board later
determined the water was from a subterranean stream. The Board
notified NGWC of this change in status and subsequently advised it to
submit a water right application to legalize the extraction of water from
the wells.
In 1993, NGWC filed a petition to change the authorized points of
diversion in its permit to include the wells while stating it reserved the
right to challenge the Board's determination that the wells pumped
from a subterranean stream. In January 1998, NGWC's consultants
filed a report which concluded the North Fork did not recharge the
groundwater under the wells and that the water did not flow from a
subterranean stream. The Board's Division of Water Rights ("DWR")
responded that it still believed the water pumped by the wells was subject to the Board's jurisdiction, because they understood the water was
flowing in a known and definite channel. DWR told NGWC that if it
wished to withdraw its petition, DWR would recommend the Board
hold a groundwater classification hearing. NGWC informed the Board
that it wanted to reserve the issue of groundwater classification for a
future hearing and wished to carry on the process of petitioning the
wells to be included in its diversion permit. In August 1999, the Board
granted an order accepting NGWC's petitions to substitute the wells
for the prior points of diversion. As conditions on the order, NGWC
had to present a surface flow measurement plan to guarantee compliance with the original permit and prepare a water flow contingency
plan to address how it would meet the customers' water needs. While
preparing the plans, NGWC requested a hearing to determine the classification of the groundwater and to discuss the Board's application of
the original permit. After receiving the plans from NGWC, DWR denied approval because it determined the terms of the original permit
applied. DWR encouraged NGWC to petition the change of bypass
flow requirements in the original permit and take the matter of
groundwater classification to the Board.
NGWC challenged the validity of the evidence supporting the
Board's denial of the plans and contested the interpretation of the
original permit by filing a declaratory relief and a writ of mandate.
The Superior Court of Mendocino County stayed the case to allow the
Board to conduct a groundwater classification hearing to resolve the
issue. After a formal request from NGWC, the hearing took place in
June 2002. The Board applied the test from the 1999 In re Garrapata
Water Co. case which determined:
[F]or groundwater to be classified as a subterranean stream flowing
through a known and definite channel, the following physical conditions must exist: (1) A subsurface channel must be present; (2) the
channel must have a relatively impermeable bed and banks; (3) the
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course of the channel must be known or capable of being determined
by reasonable inference; and (4) groundwater must be flowing in the
channel.
NGWC determined that the wells did not meet the requirements of
the test because the only subsurface channel present did not contract
or narrow, the bedrock forming the bed and banks of the alluvial
channel was not adequately impermeable, and that the groundwater
did not flow with the channel. The Board rejected these arguments
and affirmed that the subterranean stream under the wells met all
elements of the Garrapatatest. In May 2003, NGWC filed a new writ of
mandate, and the trial court held the Garrapatatest was appropriate
and that substantial evidence supported the Board's findings. NGWC
appealed to the California Court of Appeals, First Appellate District,
Division One.
The court established that it would uphold the Board's findings
unless the Board lacked substantial evidence in making its decision.
NGWC argued for a de novo review alleging that the Board did not
make any findings of fact on the disputed factual issues. The court first
used the four-part test to determine the level of deference the court
should give to the Board's interpretation. The court found that the
Legislature intended the Board's jurisdiction over groundwater to be
the exception to the rule, and the court did not need to defer to the
Board's views on this matter. The court then went on to examine the
issues that NGWC raised.
NGWC argued there was a distinction between flowing and percolating groundwater. NGWC alleged that a subterranean stream is of a
defined character and flows in known and definite channels and, thus,
does not apply to their wells. NGWC argued that the "relatively impermeable" wording of the Board's four-point test concerning the bed
and banks of the channel was not consistent with the pre-1913 case law.
NGWC argued the four-part test omitted important restrictive factors
which are implicit in the City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy case and in doing
so was over inclusive and overstated the Board's statutory authority.
NGWC also asserted that since Pomeroy defined channels as contracted
and bounded, there was no channel below the wells because the
groundwater did not contract and the bed and banks were not sufficiently impermeable to bind the groundwater. The court ruled that
the evidence did not support the assumption that a channel must contract to be a definite channel and that NGWC's absolute standard that
subterranean channels be watertight was unrealistic. The court also
held that the pre-1913 cases better supported the Board's position that
confinement of the groundwater once it entered the channel proved
the existence of a subterranean channel.
The court then addressed the relevance of flow direction. NGWC
argued the flow should be parallel to the channel or at least always
flowing in the same direction. The Board countered that nothing in
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the statute or the case law required the subterranean stream follow the
exact flow of the channel. The court held that as long as the subterranean stream flowed in the same general direction as the channel it
would suffice to meet the test and the directional deviation would be
irrelevant. The Board noted that the channel which runs beneath the
wells deviated from flowing parallel to the subterranean stream when it
hit the less permeable clay sediments near the wells, which forced the
streamflow into more permeable soils. The Board argued that the divergence of the groundwater flow was consistent with the general
downstream flow of the subterranean stream. The court found this
explanation to be adequate to explain the perpendicular flow.
Finally, NGWC argued that the four-part test be replaced with the
classifications found in 1911 treatise authored by Samuel C. Wiel,
Wiel stated that known underground streams were rare and the presumption was against their
presence. The court found that the pre-1913 case law distinguished
subterranean streams as a subclass of underground streams, which
when looked at together failed to support NGWC's claims. The court
held that the four-part test was consistent with the language and objective of the statute and that substantial evidence supported the Board's
findings. The court also found that NGWC waived the issue of the
Boards application of the original permit when it failed to raise it in
1999. The court then noted that even if NCWC had timely raised the
issue, it would not be persuasive because courts extend considerable
deference to an administrative agency's explanation of its own regulations and language.
The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that
the Board accurately interpreted a statute to determine whether
groundwater fell within the Boards permitting authority.
Kathleen Brady
WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES.

COLORADO
Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Meadow Island Ditch Co. No. 2, 132 P.3d
333 (Colo. 2006) (holding that the recipient of a contractuallydelivered water right may not change its use without the consent of the
appropriative owner and that a plan for augmentation does not violate
a contractual prohibition against changing the point of diversion for a
subject water).
The Public Service Company of Colorado ("PSCo") derived its water rights in the subject water through its 46.25% ownership in the
Beeman Ditch and Milling Company ("Beeman"). Meadow Island
Ditch Company No. 2 ("Meadow") and Beeman, under a 1905 decree,
shared a head-gate on the South Platte River, where each diverts its
respective water rights. In 1925, a dispute arose between Meadow and

